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Title of Dissertation:  Analysis of fisheries management practices in the European 
Union and the Gulf of Guinea countries: effectiveness and 
perception of resource users. 
 
Degree:  MSc. 
 
This dissertation is a study of fisheries management practices in the Gulf of Guinea 
and the European Union countries. It focuses on the access and the conservation 
measures and looks at their effectiveness concerning the conservation of the 
resource. The perception of resource users towards fisheries management practices 
is analyzed and so is the impact of this perception on the enforcement. 
  
The concept of fisheries management is briefly introduced and considerations are 
given to the new trends.  
Fisheries management practices in the European Union are analyzed through the 
Common Fisheries Policy and its tools, the total allowable catch and the quota 
system. The effectiveness of the system towards the conservation of the resource is 
assessed. The measures the Gulf of Guinea countries take to manage their fisheries 
resources including the fisheries agreements are looked at and assessed vis a vis 
the resource conservation. 
Resource users perception towards management approaches undertaken in both 
zones is analyzed and their impact on the compliance displayed. The resources 
users have similar perception, which influence their willingness to comply with 
decisions.  
Propositions are made in both zones to consider the view of resource users and 









Fisheries resources, fisheries management measures, fishermen perception, total 











Table of Contents vi 
List of Tables ix 
List of Figures x 




1.1 Background and Justification 1 
1.2 Organization of the research 4 
1.3 Methodology 4 
1.4 Scope and Limitations 5 
 
2. The concept of fisheries management 6
 
2.1 Definition and concept 6 
2.2 Objectives 9 
2.2.1 Conservation objectives 9 
2.2.2 Economic objectives 10 
2.2.3 Social objectives 11 
2.2.4 Conflict of objectives 12 
2.3 New Trends 13 
2.3.1 Ecosystem-based management 13 
2.3.2 Precautionary approach 14 





3. Fisheries management practices in the European Union 17
 
3.1 The Common Fisheries Policy 17 
3.1.1 The Concept of the Common Fisheries Policy 17 
3.1.2 Objectives 19 
3.1.3 Organization 21 
3.1.4 Resource management: access and conservation measures 22 
3.1.4.1 Access 23 
3.1.4.2 Conservation measures 25 
3.1.5 Total allowable catch and the quotas management system 28 
3.2 Effectiveness of the management approaches 31 
3.2.1 TACs and quota management system 31 
3.2.2 Fleet policy and financial support 35 
 
4. Fisheries management practices in the Gulf of Guinea 37
 
4.1 Delimitation and characteristics of the zone 37 
4.2 Management measures 49 
4.2.1 Management in the coastal zone 49 
4.2.2 Management in the EEZ: fisheries agreements 55 
4.3 Effectiveness of the management measures 56 
4.3.1 Effectiveness of the management measures in the coastal areas 56 
4.3.2 Effectiveness of fisheries agreements 57 
 
5. Perceptions of resource users towards fisheries management measures 
and enforcement 59
 
5.1 Fishermen perception towards fisheries management in the GOG 59 
5.1.1 Perceptions towards areas 59 
5.1.2 Perception towards gears 62 
5.2 Fishermen perception towards fisheries management in the EU 64 
vii 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 67
 
6.1 Conclusion 67 
6.2 Recommendations 69 
6.2.1 For the European Union countries 69 









LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table 1 Fisheries data and contribution to the national economies of GOG  
             Countries 
Table 2 Marine and fresh water catches in the GOG countries 
Table 3 Marine fish catches in the GOG from 1994 to 2003 







LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1 Decision making process in the EU Common Fisheries Policy 
Figure 2 Evolution of landings, biomass, fish mortality and recruitment in Swedish  
               Cod fishery from 1974 to 2004 
Figure 3 Map showing the Gulf of Guinea countries 
Figure 4 Fishery sector in the Gulf of Guinea countries national economies (2002) 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
CPUE  Catch per Unit of Effort 
 
EEZ   Exclusive Economic Zone 
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization 
GESAMP The Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine   
    Environmental Protection
GNP  Gross National Product 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GIWA  Global International Waters Assessment 
GOG  Gulf of Guinea 
GRT  Gross Registered Tonnage 
Ha  Hectares 
HP  Horse Power 
ICES  International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
ICCAT  International Commission for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tuna 
Km2  Square Kilometers 
Kg  Kilogram 
MINEPIA Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries 
SFLP  Sustainable Fisheries Livelihoods Programme 
UN  United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 








1.1 Background and Justification 
 
The fishery sector and fisheries resources play an important role for humans all over 
the planet. They provide a primary source of proteins for millions of people 
worldwide as seafood and constitute one of the major food items in many countries. 
The average apparent per capita food fish consumption was estimated at 16.2kg 
worldwide in 2002 (FAO, 2004).  
 
This fish consumption is, however, unequally distributed around the world; there are 
significant differences among countries, depending on the availability of the fish, the 
availability of other food, traditions and eating habits. It is rather high in poor coastal 
countries as compared with other sources of animal proteins. For instance, the per 
capita per year consumption can rise to 50kg or more in South East Asia countries 
and in low laying coral islands, where soils are poor to support intensive agriculture 
(King, M., 1995, p.8). The Food and Agriculture Organization has reported that the 
annual consumption of 21.3 kg of seafood per year represents 61.3 of animal 
protein intake in the Comoros Islands (FAO, 1998).  
 
The sector has, as well, a substantial social and economic importance. It employs 
and provide livelihood to several millions of people either directly as fishermen or 
indirectly in related activities. The Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated 
that the number of people earning an income from direct employment from the 
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fishing and aquaculture sector was about 38 million, while 200 million people were 
depending indirectly on fisheries for their livelihoods in 2002 (FAO, 2004). 
 
“These rough figures are for people earning all or part of their living from the fishing 
industry and should be multiplied by at least three to give the number of dependant 
family members” (Garcia et al., 1999, p.372).  
 
The sector is equally an important source of income for many countries. In some 
countries of the Gulf of Guinea such as Senegal for instance, fisheries products 
constitute the most important source of foreign currency, being one of the main 
export products of the country and employing 15% of the active population (Dahou, 
K. & al., 2002). 
 
 However, the important role of the sector is under threat today. The fisheries 
production systems are recognized as declining, especially for single species 
fisheries (FAO, 1995).  
 
Countries have therefore adopted various fisheries management approaches to 
ensure the sustainability of their resources. The European Union countries have on 
the one hand opted for a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). This is an “output 
limitation scheme” where the total allowable catches (TACs) for particular fishing 
species are decided by the Council and each member country is allocated quotas, 
which is a share of the TACs through the principle of relative stability.  Each member 
state will thereafter distribute the quota decided by the Council to their fishermen 
according to criterion that differs from one country to another (Malvino, C. & al., 
2002). In this system, the role of the research is important by determining the total 
allowable catch, based on the Council’s final decision.  
 
In the Gulf of Guinea countries on the other hand, there is no common global 
fisheries policy. Countries apply individual fisheries management measures, 
extensively based on the “input limitation scheme”, where fishing effort is controlled 
through licenses (Garcia, 2002). However, in some countries, which have exclusive 
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economic zones rich in resource, the fishing rights are granted to foreign fishing 
companies through fisheries agreements (Kaczynski, 2001).  
 
Despite all these efforts on resource management, the trends of landings show that 
there is a progressive decline of the production (FAO, 2004). The relative scarcity of 
fisheries resources is becoming more generalized and this trend will rather continue 
in the future due to the increasing demand, associated to the world population 
growth and the technological development of fishing methods. GESAMP has 
therefore argued that the amount of fish caught for direct humans consumption may 
fall by a fifth from 50 million tonnes in 2002 to 40 million tonnes in 2010 (GESAMP, 
2002).  
 
This indicates that the management measures undertaken by many countries, 
including the European Union and the Gulf of Guinea countries, do not in reality give 
the expected results for the conservation of the resource. This is also the case with 
the equity objectives of fisheries management, which are rarely successfully met 
(Boude, J.P., 2001). 
 
It becomes therefore important to look at the management approaches that are 
implemented in both regions and to access their effectiveness in achieving the 
conservation of the fishing resource. Furthermore, the perception of the 
stakeholders on the issue of resource management and conservation will be 
analyzed.  
 
The present study will consider and attempt to answer the following questions: 
 
-What are the fisheries management measures applied in the European Union and 
the Gulf of Guinea? 
- How effective are these measures in achieving the objectives of resource 
conservation? 
- How do fishermen perceive these measures and how does this perception impact 
on the enforcement? 
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- What recommendations can be provided for a better management of fisheries 
resources in both regions? 
  
1.2 Organization of the research 
 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter justifies the research, 
identifies its objective and methodology and displays the limitation of the study. The 
second chapter describes the fisheries management practices in the European 
Union with a particular emphasis on the principal tools of the Common Fisheries 
Policy including the total allowable catch and the quota system. The effectiveness of 
these tools in achieving the conservation objective is also analyzed.  The third 
chapter describes the fisheries management practices in the Gulf of Guinea, 
highlighting particularly management in internal waters, the fisheries agreements 
and their impact on the conservation of the resource in the zone. The fourth chapter 
attempts to analyze the point of view of the resource users as concerns the 
management measures and how it impact the conservation of the fisheries 
resources in both areas. The summary of the study and the propositions of 




This dissertation is based primarily on relevant literature from books, periodicals, 
journals and publication from the Food and Agriculture Organization and ICES. The 
author has also sought and used good information from Internet sources. Further 
information was gathered during discussions with World Maritime University (WMU) 
professors, visiting professors and some experts during field trips. 
 
A four-week field trip was undertaken in Cameron in July 2006, during which face to 
face discussions were organized with fishermen association representatives, in four 
fishing coastal fishing villages (Limbe, Batoke, Tiko and Youpwe). Equally, a 
discussion was conducted with the master of three fishing vessels as they were 
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landing to offload and sell their caches. The aim of the face to face discussions was 
to gather information on the resource users’ perception towards management 
measures. 
The discussions were supported by a guide, which determine the topics so as to 
ensure that all the areas are covered (Appendix I). 
 
The local representatives of the ministry in charge of fisheries were also visited, so 
as to exchange information and have a global picture of the activity in the area. 
1.4 Scope and Limitations 
 
This study was to benefit from the insight of the reports from the various institutions 
in both areas of studies. This was not, however, the case especially for the countries 
of the Gulf of Guinea where information was difficult to get.  
 
The information on the resource users’ perception was gathered from four fishing 
villages; which may not significantly represent the entire Gulf of Guinea countries. 
Similarly, for a proper comparison, the interview planned with fishermen in Histshals, 
Denmark could not take place; limitating the analysis to secondary information. 





THE CONCEPT OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 Definition and concept 
 
A clear definition of fisheries management is not widely accepted. The numerous 
proposed definitions usually describe the set of activities that are developed under 
the concept. The following definition is proposed by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO). 
 
      Fisheries management is the integrated process of information gathering,  
     analysis, planning, consultation, decision-making, allocation of resources and  
     formulation and implementation, with enforcement as necessary, of regulations   
     or rules which govern fisheries activities in order to ensure the continued  
     productivity of the resources and accomplishment of other fisheries objectives. 
 
                             FAO (Fisheries management, 1997, p.7) 
 
This definition suggests that to give an optimal benefit to local users, states or 
regions for the sustainable utilization of marine resources to which they have access, 
fisheries management should include two levels of activities: the strategic level and 
the operational level.  
 
The strategic component is concerned with the development, setting of policies and 
the formulation of legislation for the fisheries or stock to manage, which take into 
account the scientific knowledge available on the resource such as the biological 
characteristics of the stock, the existing or potential fisheries and the contribution to 
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local or national social and economic needs. This stage is arguably the most critical 
element in the fisheries management process. It shows the way that fisheries 
management should go and the implementation that follows is done to achieve the 
policy. Therefore a wrong policy may lead to wrong management measures, which 
can have disastrous socio-economic and fish stocks impact. This was the case with 
the Canadian cod fishery sector, which collapsed in the early 1990´s due to the 
federal Canadian Government failing to take an appropriate policy following a visible 
decline in Newfoundland cod fisheries, resulting in the closure of the fisheries in 
1992 and over 40,000 lost jobs (Parson, 1993). 
 
 The operational stage on the other hand will determine and implement the 
necessary actions, which guide fisheries to keep within the overall strategic goals 
and policy directions. 
  
According to Charles, A. (2001, p.85) the required actions should include the 
development and the implementation of a management plan of all managed stock; 
the determination of the level of fishing effort or the catch corresponding to the 
objectives set at the strategic level; the determination of the management measures 
that can feasibly achieve the above effort or catch level and which are compatible 
with the strategic management policy choices and the implementation of the set of 
chosen management measures, including the enforcement of the corresponding 
regulations. 
 
The FAO (1997) went further by suggesting the tasks that should be undertaken at 
the operational level of fisheries management, which should ensure that the stocks 
and the ecosystem within which they occur are maintained in the productive state. In 
fact, the concern of the ecosystem health is the basis of the ecosystem based 
management approach of fisheries management currently advocated by many 
International Organizations and Non Governmental Organizations as a way to 
reverse the declining trend of fisheries resources (FAO, 2003; Lundin, 2006). In 
addition, the scientific data necessary for the assessment, the monitoring, the 
control and surveillance of fisheries activities should as well be collected and 
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analyzed at this stage. These activities are the outcome of fisheries research aiming 
at providing advice to fisheries managers in the form of a range of possible 
management actions (King, M., 1995, p.269).  
The operational level should, however, adopt and promulgate appropriate and 
effective laws, regulations and management measures necessary to achieve the 
objectives and ensure that fishers comply with them, achieving therefore the overall 
policy set out at the strategic phase. The laws and regulations as well as the 
management actions should therefore be effective, widely accepted, and 
enforceable by all the stakeholders. Consequently, it is of overall importance that the 
tasks at both the strategic and operational levels should be done with the 
participation of all the stakeholders including the policy makers, the fishermen, the 
fisheries researchers and the non-governmental organizations.  
 
This approach is clearly advocated by the Food and Agricultural Organization, which 
advices a broad consultation with all the interested parties when developing the 
tasks aiming at working towards the identified objectives (FAO, 2003, p.7). The 
consultation here is supposed to integrate the view of all the interested parties and 
therefore enhances the enforcement. 
 
Some studies conducted to identify the impact of fishermen participation in policy 
formulation and the setting of management measures on the enforcement of 
conservation measures came to a conclusion that the fishermen are more willing to 
follow conservation measures when they have participate in the decision making 
rather than when the measures are imposed by the policy maker. This participation 
gives them incentives to adopt long-term conservation strategies (EU, 2002). Indeed, 
as suggested by Mc Cay, fisheries management is not the management of fish but 
the management of fishermen (Bryceson, 2006).  
 
However, various degrees of participation in decision-making results in different 
management strategies by fishermen. Malvido, C. I. et al. (2002), while looking at 
the management systems in the European Union fisheries, considered the change 
in the behavior of the resource users in the presence of different properties regimes 
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and their participation in the definition of that property. They found that long term 
efficient and conservationist behaviors depend on property rights held by the 
fishermen and their effective role in the shaping of the rules that regulates it; the 




The objectives of fisheries management are many and vary from a fishery to another.  
Three categories of objectives are often viewed as falling into fishery management: 
biology (conservation), economy and social (equity) (FAO, 1983, p20; Charles, A., 
2001, p.71).  
 
2.2.1 Conservation objectives 
 
The conservation objectives of fisheries management are concerned with the 
sustainability of the resource. They ensure that the fullest sustainable advantage is 
derived from the living resource base and that the exploitation is so initiated and 
conducted that the resource base is maintained. These objectives imply that the 
exploitation of the resource should be done in a way to which safeguards ecological 
processes, productivity and genetic diversity for the maintenance of the resource 
concerned.  
 
 King (1993) maintained that conservation is sometimes viewed as synonymous with 
preventing over fishing. He however distinguished two types of over fishing: growth 
over fishing and recruitment over fishing and argues that the conservation objectives 
should aim at preventing the recruitment over fishing so as to ensure that the 
survival of a stock or group of stocks is not threatened.  
These biologically based objectives may include the aim of maximizing the yield 
either in weight or in revenue by maintaining a particular level of stock in order to 
provide a buffer against poor recruitment years or maintaining a minimum spawning 
stock. 
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Many management tools are used to achieve conservation objectives. They may be 
an output control scheme that place limitations on catches or an input control 
scheme that puts limitations on gears or fishing vessels. However, one of the most 
used conservation objectives is the maximum sustainable yield as it was recognized 
that maximizing the long-term sustainable yield is the most important aim of fisheries 
management. 
Consequently, King (1995) suggested that the main task of fisheries management is 
to follow strategies and objectives, which ensure the long term sustainability of 
fisheries resources and which prevent both biological over fishing and the disruption 
of the marine ecosystems. 
 
This approach advocated by biologists and conservationists aims at ensuring the 
preservation and the sustainability of the resource, and hence fishing activities. In 
this approach, fisheries research is very important in advising managers with a good 
and accurate stock assessment so as to adopt appropriate regulations that ensure 
optimum fishing effort and catches resulting in the sustainability of the resources. 
   
However, to these biological and environmental concerns, fisheries management 
objectives have extended to address additional economic and social concern such 
as fishermen welfare, economic efficiency, and the allocation of the resources. The 
broad objectives of fisheries management may therefore include, in addition to the 
conservation of fisheries resources and their environment, the maximization of 
economic return from the fishery and payment of the fees to the community from 
profits made by the exploitation of public resources. 
2.2.2 Economic objectives 
 
Fisheries economists who argue that the appropriate management objectives should 
focus on economic efficiency of the fishing industry have criticized conservation 
approaches of fisheries management. Considerations are therefore given to the 
contribution of the fishing industry to the local or national economy. The tools used 
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to achieve these objectives may include the maximum net economic yield (MEY), 
which is considered to be the most important; the entry licensing coupled with 
restrictions, an output control in the form of taxation and individual transferable 
quotas.  
 
The maximum economic yield and individual transferable quotas seem the most 
used tools to foster economic viability particularly in fishery where, the resource is 
relatively stable, the number of enterprises is relatively small and the number of 
landing points is small.  
 
2.2.3 Social Objectives 
 
Fisheries are a vital source of employment and income for coastal communities. The 
Food and Agriculture Organization has estimated 200 millions people depending on 
fisheries for their livelihood worldwide (FAO, 2004). 
 
Despite this importance, Parsons (1993) indicates that social objectives for fishery 
policy have rarely been clearly articulated, although social considerations have often 
strongly influenced fisheries management decisions. Therefore, fisheries 
management objectives have often been called to serve social goals of maximizing 
employment and supporting communities’ in areas where there are few alternatives 
employment opportunities (PMEDP, 2004). Moreover, the issue of equity, which 
includes the equitable distribution of the resource among users, is often considered 
in designing fisheries management objectives.  
This is the case with the European Union common fishery policy, where the relative 
stability principle was established to ensure the equitable access of fisheries 






2.2.4 Conflict of objectives 
 
The aims pursued by a set of objectives might conflict with others. For instance, the 
conservations objectives adopted for a particular fishery might conflict with the 
economic objectives that focus on economic return of the activity. 
  
Conflicting objectives may therefore lead to bad management decisions. It is then of 
overall importance to have a hierarchy of objectives in a fishery where many set of 
objectives is applied. Pearson (1993) has argued that in the absence of a clear 
systematic hierarchical set of objectives, there cannot be any rational fishery 
management. 
  
Sinclair et al. (2002), when reviewing the choice of management objectives by 
fisheries managers over years, concluded that the interest of fisheries managers for 
economic and conservation concerns have waxed and waned.  
 
However, the most important criteria underlying the choice of management 
objectives are the resource status. There is therefore, a general agreement that 
conservation should take precedence over economic or social considerations when 
the future of the resource is jeopardized. On the contrary, economic and social 
factors will take precedence over conservation objectives when the survival of the 
resource is not at stake. 
 
There is, however, no inherent contradiction between “conservation” and “economic” 
objectives or between steps to safeguard ecosystem processes, productivity and 
biodiversity on the one hand and the economic return of the activity and its 
contribution to sustainable development of coastal economies and communities on 
the other.  Consequently, certain extreme conservationist or preservationist 
objectives can be both anti-people and anti-development and extreme reductionistic 
economic policies and objectives for example the one emphasizing economic return 
and growth may be harmful to the fish stocks but also harmful to the interests of 
coastal communities in the long term (Bryceson, 2006).   
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 Moreover, any particular regulatory technique can have multiple effects and impact 
on more than one objective of fisheries management. Charles, A.( 2001, p.72) 
considers that although in theory it is assumed that there is only one single objective 
in fisheries, the reality shows that there are multiple strategic, undeclared objectives 
pursued simultaneously. 
 
2.3 New Trends 
 
Fisheries management practices have changed over time. Caddy et al. (2001), while 
reviewing the development of fisheries management, have recognized that the 
practice has evolved from the 1900s, where the debate was centered on whether or 
not the apparent boundless fish stock of the ocean could be depleted by fishing, to a 
more recognition of the harmful effect of fishing activities on the resource.  
 
The concept of fisheries management today, which incorporates more science 
including biology, economics, social and institutional issues, is far more holistic and 
self-critical than ever (EU, 2002).  
 
2.3.1 Ecosystem-based management 
 
The fisheries operations and fishing gear used usually have bad effects on the fish, 
fish habitats and marine ecosystem. Zeller (2004) argues that traditional 
management approaches have failed to maintain sustainable levels of catches as 
well as controlling unaccepted impacts on the ecosystems in which fisheries are 
embedded (Zeller, 2004).  
 
The ecosystem-based management tries to incorporate ecosystems considerations 
into fisheries planning and implementation. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to 
clearly understand the ecosystem dynamics, the spatial and functional pattern of 
marine ecosystems as well as the role of man in marine ecosystems (Sinclair et al., 
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2002).However, there is not only one type of ecosystem in the marine environment. 
Linden (2006), giving the typology of marine ecosystem on a global scale 
distinguishes interalia, pelagic ecosystem, demersal ecosystem, benthic ecosystem, 
mangrove ecosystem, salt march ecosystem and argues that management 
concerns should be addressed accordingly. This view is supported by Sinclair (2002, 
p.258), who asserts that to protect the diversity of marine ecosystem types there is a 
need to limit ocean activities to spatial scales corresponding to the relevant 
ecosystem. 
 
Moreover, the fact that there are many types of marine ecosystems, and that there 
is interconnectivity among them, implies that any activity developed in one particular 
type of ecosystem might impact on other activities and ecosystems. The ecosystem 
considerations in fisheries management therefore imply that fisheries is considered 
in the context of other ocean and coastal zone uses such as oil and gas exploration 
and extraction, aquaculture, marine transportation, coastal zone habitation, and the 
release of contaminants, in a form of integrated and holistic management of ocean 
uses (Linden, 2006). 
 
This new approach, focusing on the ecosystem’s health for a sound management of 
the resources is currently advocated by many International Organizations and Non 
Governmental Organizations (FAO, 2003; Lundin, 2006). Indeed, the global 
framework for this ecosystem health approach was laid down in the Food and 
Agriculture Organization‘s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995).  
 
2.3.2 Precautionary approach 
 
The precautionary principle elaborated initially in Germany in the 1970s states in the 
general form that scientific uncertainty should not be a reason to postpone 
measures to prevent environmental harm (Linden, 2006).  
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The application of the precautionary principle to fisheries management was 
endorsed after the 1992 Rio summit into the UN Fish Stock Agreement and into the 
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 2004). The UN Fish stock 
Agreement contains the practical application of the precautionary approach. It 
requires States to take complex decisions on two types of precautionary reference 
points.  
 
One is the limit reference point, which is associated with danger: if a fish stock fall 
below this level, pre- agreed conservation and management actions should de 
undertaken to support the stock recovery. The overall of management strategies is 
therefore to ensure that the risk to exceed reference point is very low. The other the 
target reference point in which the management strategies should ensure that these 
are not in average exceeded. 
  
However, given the risk, the uncertainty and the political pressure associated with 
fisheries; Stokke et al. (2004) considers that the precautionary approach requires 
adaptations in the generation of scientific advice but also in the decision making 
process.  
 
 2.3.3 Community-based fisheries management 
 
The community based fisheries management, also known as co management in a 
joint management through a cooperative organization of government and resource 
users.   
 
It therefore involves decentralized control in which the government and the 
community share management responsibilities. Communities participate in the 
decision making process, make and implement regulations, determine fisheries 
management measures, supervise their implementation and invoke penalties when 
management measures and guidelines are ignored (Trisk, 2005). 
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The community-based fisheries management therefore puts more management 
responsibility on the shoulder of the stakeholders. It has the advantage to give 
incentives for the enforcement of management decisions by the stakeholders as 
they participate in their design and implementation. 
 
This approach, although not new, has come as an alternative to the failure of 
centralized management and the evidence of stock depletion (Grossling, 2006). 
However, not all the fisheries co management practices have been successful. 
Conflicts among member of the community for the resource use and for the 







 FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
 
The fisheries resources in the European Union countries are managed at the level of 
the Union Council through the common fisheries policy. 
3.1 The Common Fisheries Policy 
3.1.1 The Concept of the Common Fisheries Policy 
 
The concept of the Common Fisheries Policy was established in the treaties, which 
created the European community. It states that there should be common fisheries 
rules adopted at the Community level and implemented in all member states (Stokke 
et al., 2004). 
 
 It was, however, agreed that community fishermen should have equal access to 
member states waters, ecxept for territorial waters (12 nautical miles), that was 
reserved to local fishermen who have traditionally fished in the areas and is 
managed by the countries authorities. The European community instead of member 
states manages the fishing resources in EEZs. 
 
The Common Fisheries Policy was established in 1970. Since then, it has 
undergone several reviews, the last one being the 2002 reform. Boude et al. (2001), 
while revisiting the two CFP reforms of 1992 and 2002 maintained that although 
some changes in policy were clearly noticed, the focus was still in the area of the 
conservation of the resource particularly in the determination of a safe level of 
catches without upsetting the balance and the renewal of the stock.  
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The first review in 1992 noted that there were too many vessels for the available                            
resources and that technical measures and control alone could not prevent over 
fishing and that the amount of fishing was to be regulated too. Control measures 
were therefore developed to ensure that rules are respected throughout the industry. 
 
The second review in 2002 tried to adjust enforcement and marketing measures, in 
particular the provisions, which restrict access of fishing vessels to the inshore 
waters of other countries (12 miles), which cease to apply at the end of 2002.In 
addition to the conservation of the resource, other areas were taken into account 
including structures, common organization of market and external fisheries. 
 
The management system in the EU today is subject to the rules of the CFP which 
encompass four key areas: 
 
(a) Conservation of the stocks- to provide management measures, mainly by 
imposing a maximum catch per key species on a yearly basis, to maintain 
stocks at sustainable levels while best satisfying the needs of the fishing 
industry economically and socially; 
 
(b) Organization of markets – to provide for a common market inside the EU and 
to balance production and demand of fish for both producers and consumers; 
 
(c) Structural measures – to provide for the adaptation of the catching sector 
primarily to best utilize the stock available for both the short and the long 
term interests of the industry; 
 
(d) International agreement - to provide and maintain fishing opportunities for 
the European Community fleets operating outside the EU.  
 
                                      (Mardle, S. et al., 2002, p421) 
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 3.1.2 Objectives 
 
The Green paper on the future of the common fisheries policy produced by the 
European Commission reported that despite the fact that there is no specific chapter 
on fisheries; the Treaty assigns to the CFP the same objective as the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in its Article 33: 
 
              . to increase productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring  
                the  rational development of production and the optimum utilization of the  
                factors of production, in particular labor; 
 
              . to ensure a fair standard of living for the fishing community, in particular  
                increasing individual earnings; 
 
              . to stabilize markets; 
 
              . to assure the availability of supplies;  
 
              . to assure that supplies reach the consumers at reasonable prices; 
 
              . to ensure the principle of non- discrimination. 
 
The specific objectives of the CFP, however, include environmental and consumer 
protection concerns.  
 
The article 2 of the Council Regulation No 3760/92(OJ L 389/1, 31.12.92) stipulates 
that the exploitation activities pertaining these general objectives shall include the 
protection and the conservation of available and accessible living marine resource 
ensuring a rational and responsible exploitation on a sustainable basis taking in 
account its implication for the marine ecosystems and economic and social condition 
of the sector.  
 
The CFP as it stands today aims at: 
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(a) ensuring the conservation of increasingly fragile fish stocks while promoting 
the continuation of fishing activities; 
(b)  modernizing the mean of production while limiting fishing effort; 
(c) ensuring the proper implementation of conservation measures while member 
states retain responsibility in the field of monitoring and monitoring and 
sanctions; 
(d) maintaining employment while reducing fleet capacity; 
(e) ensuring a decent income for fishermen even though the community own 
supply of fish products is declining and the EU market depend more heavily 
on import each year and; 
(f) acquiring rights in waters of third countries without threatening the 
sustainable exploitation of fisheries. 
                                      (European Commission, 2002,p6)  
 
These objectives, stated in the green paper of the European Commission during the 
preparation of the 2002 reform, are not prioritized, which can result in a clear 
dilemma and management problems. 
 
Symes (2005) considers that the principal objectives of the CFP after the 2002 
reform could be grouped into three: (i) responsible and sustainable fisheries 
contributing to healthy marine ecosystem, (ii) economically viable industry serving 
the interests of consumers, and (iii) a fair standard of living for those dependent on 
the fishing industry. He further argues that these objectives were not too different to 
those that guided the previous CFP, but their detailed interpretation and the way 
they were to be achieved have changed. 
 
To achieve the conservation of the resource, three key elements were introduced in 
the new Regulation 2371/2002. 
 Firstly, the introduction of multiannual management plans including recovery plans 
for cod and hake, to avoid the uncertainty of annual stock assessments and 
therefore to assure greater continuity and stability of the management system. 
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Secondly, the possibility to move the basic mechanism for the limitation fishing 
pressure from the one based on catch quotas to a more flexible system of effort 
allocation in the form of day at sea. 
 
Thirdly, a more representation of fishing sector interests and the possibility of 
management at a regional level through the creation of the Regional Advisory 
Council (RACs), so as to give to the industry a sense of ownership of the policy 
decisions ensuring therefore total adhesion and enforcement in the field (Symes, 
2005,p260). 
 
In addition to these written objectives, Boude et al. (2001) argues that the Common 





The European Union CFP decision-making process (Figure 1) is characterized by 
the participation of various institutions within which different actors play different 
roles. The decision making process begins with a proposal from the Commission. A 
proposal is the result of studies and advices proposed by different relevant groups. 
The main institution to prepare the recommendations is the Scientific Technical and 
Economic Committee of Fisheries (STECF) of the Commission. The proposals of 
this group are eventually prepared after consultation with ICES Advisory Committee 
on Fisheries Management (ACFM) that produce scientific advice to the European 
Commission. 
 
The Commission then forms a proposal in light of the scientific advice and the 
discussions with various relevant departments and committees, including the 
Scientific Technical and Economic Committee of Fisheries and the European 
Parliament Fisheries Committee. 
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Considering the various actors involved, it is often difficult to find a compromise on a 
proposal; hence the Commission uses its monopoly of initiative to try and forge 
compromises around the proposals (Reyntjens and Wilson, 2004).  
 
The proposals are then sent to the Council of Ministers, made-up of national 
ministers from members’ states, which have the final authority to decide on the 
policy. The decisions on total allowable catch and quotas and any related measures 
are taken by the ministers at the end of year meeting of the Council. At this stage, 
negotiation may be required to reach a political agreement on a given measure.  
 
Thereafter, the Commission monitors the implementation of the policy by individual 
Member States. 
 
3.1.4 Resource management: access and conservation measures 
 
Fisheries resource management in the European Union waters is an exclusive 
Community competence. However, the management of the resource in member 
countries coastal waters, which can be up to 12 nautical miles wide, is done by 
member states as far as they are delegated powers by the Community (Reyntjens 
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Figure 1 Decision making process for the Common Fisheries Policy 
 





The structure of the access rights to European fisheries is influenced by the 
common fisheries policy. Among the first community measures for the access to 
fishing grounds, it was agreed that community fishermen should have equal access 
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to member states waters, except for the coastal zone, which is of 12 miles wide, 
reserved for local fishermen who have traditionally fished in the zone (Boude, 2001). 
 
Despite these possibilities, many countries have opted to keep this zone narrower. 
This is the case with the United Kingdom inshore waters, where the Sea Fisheries 
Committees manage fisheries within six miles (Mardle et al., 2002).  
 
In addition, measures taken by the states within the coastal zone may not be in 
conflict with the overall Common Fisheries Policy. Moreover, some individual 
countries through the increase regulation such as increasing landing size might 
tighten the EC policy.  
 
The fishing resources out of the territorial sea are reserved to the community 
fishermen and are managed by the community instead of members’ states. Fishing 
activities here are open to all fishermen but are restricted in some specific areas 
determined by the community; for instance the Plaice Box or the Shetland box. 
 
Mardle et al. (2002) have therefore identified three levels of management in the 
European Union fisheries, which correspond to different access conditions, different 
management tools and different stakeholders: the European Union level, the 
national level and the regional level. 
 
The European Union set the total allowable catch through the Council of Minister 
and allocates the quotas for some key species to member States according to the 
principle of the relative stability, which corresponds to the quantities of fish the 
fishermen of the country can have access to and fished within one year. 
 
The management at the national level is done by country organizations including 
fisheries administrations, government authorities, fishers associations and other 
professional organizations. These institutions decide on the access of their share of 
the overall quota. They divide and allocate the country quota to local fishermen 
through approaches that may be different from one country to another. 
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Local communities or local government authorities can also be in charge of the 
management of fisheries resources at the local level. 
 
3.1.4.2 Conservation measures 
 
The technical policy of the community is based on a variety of actions including 
technical measures, fisheries access restrictions and fleet reduction schemes.  
 
3.1.4.2.1 Access restrictions (Norway pout box, Shetland box) 
 
The access to waters and resources are restricted in some areas of the European 
community waters. These restrictions were established to protect the biologically 
sensitive species that are found in the area on the one hand and on the other hand, 
to limit the effort on the resource (Karagionnakis, 1995). 
  
In addition, the setting of the Shetland box helped in reaching acceptance of the 
equilibrium established between the different fleets and the fishing communities (EC, 
2002). Indeed, the development of the stock in this box does not allow any increase 
in the fishing effort. The European Commission has therefore maintained the current 
restriction on fishing activities so as to keep the balance between the fishing 
communities and the fishing fleet. 
 
The Norway pout box, which was introduced in 1986, covered an area of 95,000 
km2. It was designed for juveniles stock of haddock, which were produced as by 
catch during the massive exploitation of the Norway pout.  
However, explicit management for the Norway pout box has not clearly been defined. 
The EU and Norway have therefore adopted a precautionary approach by adopting 
some technical measures such as closed Norway pout box, minimum mesh size 
regulation and by-catch regulation ensuring that the stock is remained high to 
provide food to predators (ICES, 2006). 
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Further measures limitating the access to the waters other than the Mediterranean 
Sea were imposed on Spain and Portugal during their accession in 1985, for a 
period up to December 2002 (Karagionnakis, 1995).  
 
All these measures that control “input” to the fishery sector restrict access aimed at 
the conservation of the resource; therefore balancing the fishing effort to the 
available stock.  
 
3.1.4.2.2 Technical measures 
 
The European community, to ensure the conservation of the resource, has put into 
place a variety of technical measures, which, based on scientific advice, covers the 
following areas: 
 
• Regulation on mesh sizes and fishing nets; 
• Regulation on fish sizes that may be retained on board, landed or offer for 
sale; 
• Regulation on fishing gear and appliances; 
• Establishment of open, closed areas and seasons; 
• Restriction of access to certain areas for licensed vessels according to their 
capacity and sizes; 
• Regulations of time spend at sea for certain type of vessels. 
 
These regulations contained in the Council regulation No 3094/86 of the 7 October 
1986 are applied individually or in combination (Karagionnakis, 1995). 
 
The bulk of technical measures have since then undergone some changes in 1996, 
aimed at harmonizing the mesh sizes over the whole areas covered by the 
regulation; reducing the mandatory discarding; increasing the selectivity of the 
fishing gear and to simplify the rules, making them easier to control and monitor. 
The, basic rules established in 1986 were not changed (Mardle, 2002). 
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The new framework applicable from the 1 January 2000 constitutes some 
improvement of fishing practices, particularly in respect of the protection of young 
fish. Indeed certain fishing gear, which results in the high mortality of young fish, is 
prohibited. This is the case with the drift net banned since the 1st January 2002 , 
following the Council regulation No 850/98, aiming at protecting the juvenile marine 
organisms, ensuring therefore the sustainability of the resource. This worldwide ban 
for the Community vessels except for the Baltic Sea, according to the European 
community was to have a major beneficial effect on the conservation of small 
cetaceans and some species of fish (EC, 2002). 
 
The technical measures are not however uniform in the European waters or in all 
the EU countries. For instance, in the Baltic Sea there are specific technical 
measures that were adopted by the International Baltic Sea Commission including 
the seasonal closure to protect the cod and salmon; the establishment of technical 
specifications of the fishing gears (meshes sizes, escape windows in trawls). The 
measures are expected to contribute to rebuild the stocks. 
 
Similarly, the Council has adopted Regulation No 1624/94 for Mediterranean 
fisheries, laying down the specific technical measures for the conservation of 
fisheries resources in this area. Additional measures were introduced by the 
International Commission for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tuna  (ICCAT), to 
manage the blue tuna and the sword fish, including landing sizes, seasonal closures 
and restriction on the use of aircraft as aid for fishing operations (EC, 2002, p.10). 
 
Moreover, some individual countries and some local governments have adopted 
some specific measures to reinforce in their areas by making the Community 
technical measures more stringent. For example, the management unit of the fishing 
resources in the English Channel has adopted measures including the increase of 
the EC minimum landing size for given species; limits on boat sizes in the district 
and temporary fishing closures (Mardle et al., 2002). 
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3.1.3.2.3 Fleet reduction scheme 
 
The fishing capacity of the EC is recognized as being above the required rational 
exploitation of the available resources, resulting in overexploitation (Symes, 2005). 
The European Community has therefore adopted the Multi Guidance Programme for 
the fishing fleet (MAGP), a capacity reduction scheme, to ensure that the fishing 
capacity and the exploitation rate are consistent with the long term management 
objectives (EC, 2003). 
 
The report of the first MAGP III, which covers the period from 1991 to 1997 shows 
that the fishing fleet from the EC was reduced by about 15% Gross tonnage (GRT) 
and 9.5% in Kilowatts. The implementation by Member States of this input control 
scheme was, however, below the global objectives by tonnage and by power 
(Malvino, 2002). 
 
The MAGP IV adopted by the commission in 1997 was less ambitious and proposed 
a reduction of 5% over a 5-year period. Despite the fact that this objective is less 
stringent, it is likely not to be achieved by member states. In fact, the EC reported 
that as from the 1st January 2000, the Community fleet was already 17% below the 
objective in terms of tonnage and 6% below the objectives in terms of power (EC, 
2003). 
 
Consequently, the reduction rate was recognized to be less to counter the 
technological development of the fleet resulting from the improvement in technology, 
the efficiency of fishing boat or the technological progress of fishing gear. 
 
3.1.5 Total allowable catch and the quotas management system 
 
The European Community system of fisheries management is based on the total 
allowable catch (TAC). Along with the quotas system, it is the corner stone of all the 
conservation measures of the Common Fisheries Policy (Karagionnakis, 1995). 
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The Council Regulation 170/83 of the EC legally established the system, which 
controls output into the fisheries, in 1983. The Council of the European Union 
establishes yearly the total allowable catch for the major species, including Cod, 
Haddock, Whiting, Saithe, Plaice, Mackerel and Herring, based on the scientific 
advice from the STECF, after some input from the ICES Advisory Committee on 
fisheries management. 
 
The new framework put in place by Regulation 2371/2002 has introduced the 
multiannual management plan including recovery plans for stocks outside biological 
limit such as hake and cod, to avoid the uncertainty of annual stock assessments 
and therefore to assure greater continuity and stability of the management system. 
 
The predetermined decisions or harvesting rules are expected to end the practice 
that had resulted in priority being given to avoid restricting fishing that were 
politically unpopular in the short term (Stokke et al., 2004). It will as well permit the 
fishermen to program their work far ahead in time such as to take a full advantage of 
the quota and therefore adopt conservation strategies. However, for the time being, 
in the absence of the pre-arranged rules TACs are still set annually. 
 
The agreed overall quota is divided among the member countries according to the 
principle of “relative stability”. The relative stability principle, the maintenance of a 
fixed quota per stock of the available resource for each Member State in the EU 
takes into consideration three key factors: 
 
• The traditional fishing pattern for the community fleet and the catches for the 
1973-1978 period used as a reference point; 
• Certain preferences termed “Hague preference” to applied to certain 
fishermen in some regions, where there were and still are few jobs 
opportunities for alternative employment; 
• The losses suffered by the member States fishing vessels in third countries 
after the introduction of the 200 nautical miles EEZ. 
                               Karagiannakos, 1995, p.236  
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Mardle et al. (2002) consider, however, that the most important key factor for the 
relative stability is historic participation in the fishery concerned. For the future 
allocation of quota, the distribution of 1982 was to be the “reference allocation”, 
which was made resilient to cope with the changes in the fish stock population and 
the economic parameter of the fishing industry. 
 
Despite this, some quota trade does exist during the process of quota allocation, 
showing therefore one of the EC major concerns of the concept of relative stability in 
the common market arena (Newell, G. et al., 2005). 
 
Similarly, the enlargement of the EC in 2004 from 15 to 25 Member States and the 
probable further expansion to 28 with the accession of Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey, will render the distribution of quotas among states more complex (Symes, 
2005). 
 
The quota decided for each Member State is thereafter distributed to their various 
fishermen according to criteria that are specific to each country.  
 
Malvido et al. (2002) while describing the way in which the fishing rights are 
allocated to national fishermen, in the countries whose fleets work in the Community 
Atlantic waters including Portugal, France Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland and Ireland, argues that the system of resource management in most of 
them is centralized and interventionist, since the authority principle is generally used 
to allocate quotas decided in Brussels. 
The Government agencies decide both on what the TAC and the license allocation 
criteria are for fishermen, in such a way that they cannot modify the initial allocation. 
Each fisherman just has to catch his quota in the fishing ground granted in his 
license. 
This approach is slightly different for Spain, where the fishing rights, right of access 
(measured in fishing days) and quotas although given by the government agencies 
can be transferred. 
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3.2 Effectiveness of the management approaches 
 
The tools to manage the Community fisheries resources are many and varied 
including the setting up of the total allowable catch and the quotas management 
system, the access limitations and technical measures, the fleet policy and the 
recovery and management plans; but how effective are these measures to achieve 
the objective of resource conservation ensuring therefore the sustainability of the 
activity? The effectiveness criteria therefore allow the comparison between the 
projected and the actual outcomes and the analysis of the problems arising from the 
implementation of a given management measure (Boude et al., 2001). 
 
3.2.1 TACs and quota management system 
 
 
The Council, based on scientific advice produced by the Scientific Technical and 
Economic Committee of Fisheries (STECF) of the Commission after consultation 
with ICES Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management (ACFM) that produce 
scientific advice to the European Commission, sets the TACs annually. 
  
 However, the overall quotas agreed on do not all the time reflect the scientific 
advice, as they are almost always set beyond the level of the advice. This fact is 
well shown in the study conducted by Karagiannakos in 1995, who after comparing 
the recommended TACs, the agreed TACs, the catches and the biomass for the 
major demersal species of the north sea for the period from 1980 to 1994, shows 
that the agreed TAC do not follow the recommended TAC and is almost all the time 
set above it for all the species under consideration including Cod, Haddock, Saithe, 
Whiting and Sole. He also found that the catches follow the biomass rather than the 
recommended TACs.  He concluded that the TAC system has failed to attain its 
conservation objective, which is to maintain the resource for the species concerned 
as it does not represent the current catch situation which is more affected by the 
condition of the stocks in nature rather than the imposition of catch. 
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In addition, the difference between the landings and the agreed TACs displays a 
failure of fishermen to comply with the TAC, which diminishes the effectiveness of 
the system. The discrepancy between the biomass, the landings and the 
recommended TAC is well observed in the Swedish Cod fisheries (Figure 2), where 
catch rather the status of the stock.  
 
The fact that the settings of TACs do not follow the recommended TAC is induced 
by the political pressure involved; which has lead Boude et al. (2001) to argue that 
the CFP has an “unwritten” more important objective, which is to preserve social 
peace. In fact, considering the various actors involved, it is often difficult to find 
compromise on a proposal; hence the Commission uses its monopoly of initiative to 
try and forge compromises around the proposals (Reyntjens and Wilson, 2004). 
Moreover, the decision on TACs is supposed to be based on the scientific advice 
available, which in turn reflects the actual status of the stocks. The stock 
assessment is, however, far from being a precise science taking into consideration 
the uncertainty in the fish community interactions, the problem of by-catch, the often 
non involvement of the industry in the assessment, the susceptibility of the stock 
assessment techniques and the scientist’s working environment.  
 
Daw et al. (2005) have also reported that three types of uncertainty are inherent to 
fisheries science: apparently random fluctuation in fishery characteristics; 
uncertainty in the parameters that describe the behavior of the fishery and the lack 
of the scientific understanding of interactions within ecosystems that control their 
behavior. They therefore argue that stock assessment may typically have error 









Fig 2 Evolution of landings, fish mortality, recruitment and biomass in 
                          Swedish Cod fisheries from 1974 to 2004 
 




           
 
 In addition, the quota system, which defines the amount of a particular fish to be 
landed by a given boat, favors the phenomenon of “high grading”.  Fishermen are 
encouraged to adopt economic strategies and retain the larger and more valuable 
fish in order to maximize the economic benefit of their quotas, increasing therefore 
the discards at sea and the production of by-catch (Shepherd, 2003). 
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The management of the EU fisheries is done at three levels: the Council for the 
setting of TACs; the national authorities for the distribution of national quota to 
fishermen and the local level by local government or producers organizations. This 
situation of many levels of management has lead Boude et al. (2001) to believe that 
the European Union, with the Common Fisheries Policy and the various local or 
national access conditions and management schemes, could hamper the 
effectiveness of the resource conservation. 
  
Moreover, the different ways in which the access rights are granted has an impact 
on the one hand on the enforcement and appropriation of the management 
measures by fishermen and on the other hand on the conservation of the resource. 
Malvino et al. (2002), while studying the management systems in the European 
Union, describe the Common Fisheries Policy as a centralized and interventionist 
system, where the initial allocation of operational rights, the right of access and that 
of withdrawal are defined by the Commission. For instance, the fisherman, after 
receiving his license and his quota, has no instrument to change the initial right 
allocation, nor is there a mechanism to take part or have an influence on the design 
of this right. The allocation of the resource does not meet the competition or a 
cooperative criteria, but it just result from the authority discretion (Malvino et al., 
2002). 
 
In this system the fisherman has no influence on the allocation of rights and 
becomes a simple user in a system that is recognized as a top down approach and 
do not therefore have any incentive to enforce management measures and adopt 
long term management strategies that result in the conservation of the resource (EC, 
2002). 
The advent of a more representation of fishing sector interests and the possibility of 
management at a regional level through the creation of the Regional Advisory 
Council (RACs), so as to give to the industry a sense of ownership of the policy 
decisions ensuring therefore total adhesion and enforcement in the field may not 
give the expected results due to the fact that the RACs do not have any real power 
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of decision and fishermen may be less willing to comply with policy decisions 
(Symes, 2005, p.260). 
 
3.2.2 Fleet policy and financial support 
 
The European Community, to reverse the overcapacity of its fleet has adopted the 
Multi Guidance Programme for the fishing fleet (MAGP); a capacity reduction 
scheme, to ensure that the fishing capacity and the exploitation rate are consistent 
with the long term management objectives (EC, 2003). 
 
The MAGP III, which covers the period from 1991 to 1997, shows a reduction of 
about 15% Gross tonnage (GRT) and 9.5% in Kilowatts of the Community fleet while 
the Gulland report recommended a reduction of 40% in fish mortality (Daw et al., 
2005). The implementation by Member States of this input control scheme was, 
however, below the global objectives by tonnage and by power (Malvino, 2002). 
 
Further, the MAGP IV adopted by the Commission in 1997 was less ambitious and 
proposed a reduction of 5% over a 5-year period. Despite the fact that this objective 
is less stringent, it is likely not to be achieved by member states. In fact, the 
European Community reported that as from the 1st January 2000, the Community 
fleet was already 17% below the objective in terms of tonnage and 6% below the 
objectives in terms of power (EC, 2003). Consequently, Symes (2005) has 
maintained that the low reduction rate associated with the reluctance of the member 
States to implement these policies will be less effective to counter the technological 
development of the fleet resulting from the improvement in technology, the efficiency 
of fishing boat or the technological progress of fishing gears. 
 
In addition, the future development of the European fishing industry may rather 
worsen the situation of the stocks. For instance, under the present FIFG programme 
(2000-2006), new vessel construction and the modernization of existing vessels was 
to account for Euro 833 million compared to an allocation of Euro 454 million for the 
removal of the vessels from the fleet. Symes (2005) has therefore argued that 
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fishing capacity remains significantly above that required for the rational exploitation 
of the available resource. 
 
Moreover, with the present difficulties resulting from the increase in the price of the 
fuel, a proposal of the European Commission to help EU fishermen install new 
engines that use fuel efficiently was tabled to the EU fishing Ministers meeting in 
Luxembourg last April 2006 after pressure from the major fishing countries. The 
proposal was not, however, approved by the Ministers, claiming that the new engine 
will be more efficient and will increase the fishing capacity; jeopardizing therefore 
the conservation of an already overexploited European fish Stocks (Kuchler, 





FISHERIES MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE GULF OF 
GUINEA 
 
4.1 DELIMITATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ZONE 
 
4.1.1 Delimitation 
The Gulf of Guinea is located in the narrow protrusion of the eastern Atlantic Ocean 




Figure 3   Map showing the Gulf of Guinea countries 
 
Source: Wikepedia map (Retrieved from http:// upload. Wikepedia/ commons/gulf of  






The area extends from the northern border of Mauritania to the southern border of 
the Namibian Republic, including the islands of Sao Tome and Principe and Cape 
Verde; for a coastline of 7600km (Ukwe et al., 2006). 
 
The following West and Central African countries are part of the Gulf of Guinea: 
Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote 
d´Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Namibia and Islands of Sao Tome 
and Principe and Cape Verde (Figure 3). 
  
4.1.2 Oceanography of the zone 
 
 
The predominant features of this shallow ocean bordering the countries of western 
and Central Africa is the Guinea current. The Guinea Current is well defined by Mc 
Graw Hill as the counter current, which flows in an easterly direction between the 
south and the north equatorial current (as cited by Ukwe et al., 2003).  
 
This implies that the north and the south equatorial currents contribute greatly to the 
circulation of waters, which flow in pretty much the way as the major surface winds 
(Giwa, 2003). 
 
The northern subsystem of the Gulf of Guinea is thermally instable and is 
characterized by intensive seasonal upwelling while the southern half depends on 
nutrients inputs originating form land drainage, rivers flows and turbulent diffusions 
(Ukwe & al., 2003).  Indeed, the southern zone of the gulf receives many rivers that 
constitute the Congo basin and feed the area with sediments from coastal erosion. 
 
However, the circulation of waters in the swampy forest inside the creeks on the 
coastline is very slow due to the presence of roots of the dominant mangrove 
vegetation in the area (Folack, 1995).  
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These characteristics make the Gulf of Guinea one of the world’s most productive 
marine areas, which is rich in fisheries resources, oil, gas reserves, precious mineral, 
and reservoir of marine biodiversity (Ukwe & al., 2003).  
 
The surface temperature of sea in the Gulf of Guinea is generally 10 Celsius warmer 
than the air temperature, which is always high. The vertical transport in upwelling 
zones and the horizontal water transport in the region can however change this 
pattern. The salinity of the water varies between 3.7 % in the high latitudes and 3% 
in the equatorial area of the GOG, due the hydrographical input from the rivers.  
 
4.1.3 Main coastal ecosystems and biodiversity 
 
The mangrove forests exist and are scattered along the whole coast of all the 
countries of the Gulf of Guinea area. The mangrove forest here is mainly composed 
of Rhizophora, Conocarpus and Avicenna species. The most important reserve of 
mangrove in Africa is located in the delta of the river Niger in Nigeria. It is ranked the 
first largest mangrove area in Africa and the third largest in the world and can be up 
to 50km wide. 
 
The mangrove ecosystem constitutes a very important spawning area and is the 
breeding grounds for many demersal and shrimp species as well as for many trans 
boundary fish species (Ukwe & al., 2003). They are however regressing all over the 
area. A study conducted in Cameroon by Tsiotsop (2002) show that due to the 
cutting down of the mangrove forest related to urbanization and its use as a fuel 
food, 1,100 ha are being destroyed every year loosing therefore its important 
biological role including the  reproduction and spawning zones for the major 
commercial fishes and the protection of coastal areas. He reported that this 
depreciation rate is far less than what is observed in Guinea Republic with 22,500 
ha per year, displaying therefore the gravity of the situation.  
 
In addition to the mangroves, some coral formations are distributed along the coast 
of some Central and West African countries. They occur in Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
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Cote d´Ivoire, Ghana, Gabon and around the island of Sao Tome and Bioko (GIWA, 
2003).  
 
Besides, the region has a high biological value with the presence of some 
endangered marine mammal species classified in the red list of the UICN such as 
the African manatee, the Humpbacked dolphin and four over the seven remaining 
turtle species in the world that use to select places along the coastline to lay eggs 
(Ukwe & al., 2003). 
 
 4.1.4 Fisheries resources  
   
The Gulf of Guinea receives sediments from the vast river network and from coastal 
erosion. These characteristics, associated with the seasonal upwelling in the 
northern part of the region make it a zone rich in fisheries resources and a precious 
reservoir of marine biodiversity. 
 
 As a result, the fishing industry is well developed in the GOG, exploiting locally 
important and migratory stocks and supports the economy of most of the countries 
in the area. Table 1 show that the fisheries sector participates in the GDP of all the 
countries of the region. This contribution varies from country to country depending 
on the relative importance of the water body.  
 
The contribution of the sector to the GDP is very low in inland countries such as 
Burkina Faso (0.1%), and relatively high in countries with extensive EEZ such as 
Senegal, Mauritania, the Gambia and Sao Tome; where the sector produces more 
than 5% of the country’s wealth and constitutes more than 20% of the primary sector 
(See figure 1). 
  
Dahou, K. & al. (2002) have reported that in Senegal the fishing sector is the first 
and the most important source of foreign currencies. This is also the case with the 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Indeed as clearly shown in table 1, the commercial 
balance between export and import of fishing products is by far positive for Senegal, 
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Mauritania and Gabon, displaying therefore the important role of the sector as a 
source of foreign income. These countries and many others of the GOG zone have 
declared extensive EEZ; which are highly rich in fisheries resources. Mauritania, 
Gabon and Sao Tome have EEZ of more than 200,000 km2 (table 1); where a large 
fishing fleet under fisheries agreements exploits large banks of transboundary and 
high migratory fish species including tuna, herring, anchovy, crustaceans and 
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  Figure 4:  Fisheries sector in the Gulf of Guinea countries national economy (2002) 





The production of marine fishes has almost followed the same pattern. During the 
same period of time, the annual fish catch of the marine zone ranged between 
1,111,682 and 1,534,475 tonnes (Table 3). 
 
 These figures generally show an increasing trend with occasional variations. 
However, the production became more stable from 1998, when it exceeded 2 million 
tons (Figure 2). 
Between 1994 and 2003, the overall catches in the countries of GOG ranged from 







             Source: Adapted from FAO (2005) 




















  Benin Burkina Faso Cameroun Cap Verde Congo 
Côte 
d’Ivoire Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Mali Mauritania Saõ Tome Senegal 
GDP/capita (US$) 1 070 1 100 2 000 5 000 980 1 520 6 590 1 690 2 130 2 100 930 2 220 1 317 1 580 
GNP/ capita (US$) 380 240 610 1 060 690 700 3 950 340 390 540 250 410 280 530 
IDH 0,42 0,30 0,50 0,717 0,49 0,40 0,65 0,45 0,57 0,42 0,33 0,46 0,65 0,44 




Pop/.pov.level  33 % 45 % 40 % n.d. n.d. 37 % n.d. 64 % 39 % 40 % 64 % 46 % n.d. 33 % 
EEZ (km²) 20 000 0 n.d. n.d. 60 000 204 600 213 000 10 500  110 000 n.d. 0 230 000 160 000 n.d. 
Cont shelf. (km²) 3 100 0 14 000 5 394 10 000 12 000 40 600 4 000 24 300 56 000 0 36 000 1 460 27 600 Context geographic 
Area cont wat (km²) 316 1 220 n.d. n.d. 10 000 6 037 10 000 11 8 746 n.d. >20 909 n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Prod° domestic 
(tonnes) 37 136 11 700 
180 000 
(2003) 8 061 43 456 77 366 43 986 44 496 429 310 142 620 103 803 81 544 3 820 426 831 
Prod° continental 49 % 100 % 41 % n.d. 47 % 20 % 24 % n.d. 19 % 3,5 % 100 % 6 % n.d. n.d. 
Value Production 


















1,32 $/kg 59 8940 
152 455 
1,47 $/kg n.d. 











0,96 $/kg n.d. 32 328 n.d. 
9 543 
1,12 $/kg n.d. 
69 437 
0,90 $/kg n.d. 
145 195 
1,47 $/kg n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Food security 
… fisheries maritime 
artisanal 
6 604 






1,71 $/kg 52 901 n.d. n.d. 99 % n.d. 
Exportat° (1000 $) 1 607 7 953 1 402 2 004 129 890 15 297 2 734 69 619 9 407 354 69 273 6 113 269 513 
Importat° (1000 $) 7 046 1 582 29 215 821 19 984 148 265 7 059 681 94 701 5 506 2 135 615 206 2 066 
Balance com. - 5 439 - 1 575 - 28 262 581 - 17 980 - 18 375 8 238 2 053 - 25 082 3 901 - 1 781 68 658 5 907 267 447 
 Fish trade 
2000–2002 
Dispo/capita(kg/an) 8,8 2,3 13,6 21,9 18,3 15 44,1 23,5 29,7 12,8 8,3 11,5 13,7 29,2 
Value added 




(2003) 93 299 203 451 
82 097 
(2001) 40 763 305 755 54 470 144 833 58 934 4 160 261 973 
…fisheries artis. ~ 98 % 100 % 44,0 %  43,4 % 60,2 % 65,8 % 88,3 % 77 % 87,3 % 100 % 42,2 %  88 % 
…transformation. 10,5 % 15,9 % 14,1 % 4,6 % 9,7 % 35,1 % 3,9 % 3,7 %      11,3 % 
Cont. fisheries /GDP 2,9 % 0,4 % 1,7 % 3,9 % 2,7 % 1,5 % 1,5 % 5,7 % 3 % 1,8 % 4 % 5,3 % 5,2 % 4,1 % 
Fish / sect prim2 7,8 % 1,25 % 4,0 % 10,8 % 22,9 % 6 % 14 % 17,3 % 5 % 8,2 % 8,9 % 22 % 19,2 % 24,1 % 
Cont. State budget3 n.d. 43 k$ + taxes n.d. n.d. 274 k$ 8 003 k$ 7 169 k$ 10 500 k$ 1 247 k$ 7 568 k$ 
31,5 k$ + 
taxes n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Investment 12 006 k$ n.d. 13 606 k$ n.d. 6 528 k$ 6 883 k$ 12 623 k$ n.d. n.d. n.d. >8 582 k$ 15 861 k$ 16 071 n.d. 
National 
wealth 
Employ./ total pop 10 % > 1 % 1,25 % 14,6 % 7,9 % > 0,15 % 3,4 % 15,4 % 10 % 1,6 % 2,7 % 1,3 % 3,3 % > 1% 
43
Table 1: Fisheries data and contribution to the national economies of GOG countries 
                                                 
1 Human development report (2004), UNDP. The data are from 2002.                                                                                                 (Source: Adapted from SFLP/ FAO (2006))  
2 The primary sector includes products values added from agriculture, livestock, hunting, fisheries, and aquaculture. 
3 The two types of available contributions : fishing licenses and commercial taxes 
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Therefore, the steady increasing annual pattern observed on the overall production 
is justified by the continental artisanal catches, which has gain a relative importance 
in the zone with the exploitation of the rich continental hydrology (Figure2).  In fact, 
in addition to large natural and artificial lakes, large river basins are present in each 
country of the zone, in which fisheries activities are being developed (GIWA, 2003).  
 
The development of inland fishing is gaining some importance in countries such as 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon or the Republic of Congo in which the 
production of this sector is higher than that of the maritime sub sector. In the 
Democratic Republic of Congo for instance, the production of the continental 
fisheries accounts for 98% of the total fish production of the country with more than 
200 thousands tonnes of fresh fishes catches annually. In Cameroon as well, the 
production of the continental fisheries has steadily increased over years and 
accounts for 47% of the country total production in 2003 (Table1). 
 
Despite the importance of the sector for the Gulf of Guinea countries, the potential of 
fishery resources in the area is not well known. The last stock assessment was 
carried out between June and July 2006 in the GOG zone, by the Norwegian 
scientific boat NANSEN. The result of this stock assessment, which covers almost 
all the countries of the Gulf of Guinea from Ghana to the Congo Republic, is yet to 
be published.  
  
However, a former survey conducted in 1990 to assess the resources of the Gulf of 
Guinea maritime zone had shown that the coastal area of the region although poor 
in demersal commercial fish stocks was rich in small pelagic species including 
Sardinella, Ethmalosa, Anchovy ssp (FAO; 1991). This relative poverty of the zone 
as compared with other fishing zones in Africa is related interalia to its 
oceanography. The zone witnesses a high thermo cline, which prevents the nutrient 
rich deep water to mix with the surface water, lessening therefore the primary 
productivity (Linden, 2006).  
 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Benin 39923 44379 42175 43785 42139 40436 32324 38415 40663 41893
Cameroun 79000 94131 98400 102000 106800 110000 112109 111031 120135 107801
Congo DR 155897 158627 163010 162211 178041 208448 209300 214600 220000 220000
Congo R 42664 45776 45473 38082 42955 43509 45958 48830 51003 52373
Ivory 
coast 73978 70139 69168 64169 69572 74365 75772 73556 79743 68903
Eq Guinea 5069 2306 5040 6090 6005 7001 3634 3500 3500 3500
Gabon 31015 40437 46113 43584 53609 51143 47470 42871 40875 44775
Ghana 335437 352844 476733 447088 442641 492776 452070 447681 371178 390756
Guinea 63800 67860 63360 62441 69764 87314 91513 105402 92755 118845
Guinea B 6000 6328 7000 7250 6000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
Liberia 7721 8829 8308 8580 10830 15472 11726 11286 11500 11300
Nigeria 267059 349482 337993 387923 463024 455628 441377 452146 481056 475162
Sao Tome 3391 3565 3980 3338 3477 3756 3500 3400 3300 3283
Sierra L 62439 64870 67304 72628 63065 59407 74730 75210 82990 96926
Togo 13052 12201 15098 14290 16655 22924 22277 23163 20946 27485
Mauritania 51746 53147 60324 57756 61660 76026 80849 84881 78902 80000
Senegal 352421 354617 411759 457366 403872 412125 402047 403202 375824 448174
TOTAL 1590612 1729538 1921238 1978581 2040109 2165330 2111656 2144174 2079370 2196176









Seasonal upwelling does occurs in the upper area of the GOG between July to 
September; however limited in scale due to the influx of warm, low salinity water 
originating from the Bay of Biafra and the Guinea coast (GIWA, 2003). 
 
This situation favors the development of small-scale artisanal fisheries that exploit 
small pelagic species. Indeed, the majority of the marine production is done by 
artisanal fishermen, whose catches account for 60% of the overall landings in the 
zone (Ukwe & al., 2003). The figure is rather high in Cameroon for instance; where 
the production of the artisanal fishermen have accounted for 95% of the total 
production of fish in the country during 2003 (MINEPIA, 2004).    
 
Another characteristic of the fisheries in the continental shelves of the Gulf of 
Guinea is coastal fish assemblage (croackers), located principally in nutrient-rich 
estuarine and inshore areas (Koranteng, 2002). Moreover, a study conducted by 
Folack (1995) describes GOG maritime resources as a multispecific type 
characterized many commercial species of fishes living together in the same areas. 
Consequently, the quantity of non-targeted fishes caught in the fishing gear as by-
catch is rather high for both the artisanal and industrial fisheries.  
 
A study conducted by Njifounjou et al. (1999), assessing the level of by-catch and 
discards in shrimp trawling in Cameroon concludes that the activity produce more 
than 60% of by-catch, that are then generally discarded into the sea. This production 
of by-catch is not only limited to the industrial but also extends to the small scale 
fisheries where gear with small mesh sizes are used and catch immature and small 
fish species. 
 
Another characteristic of the Gulf of Guinea is that some areas of the coastal 
shallow water constitute a mixed zone use by many commercial species as nursery 
and breeding areas. Moses, B. (1992) maintains after analyzing the distribution of 
the fishes in the zone that fisheries resources in the coastal waters of the Gulf of 
Guinea are concentrated between the depths of 20 to 40 meters and are constituted 
of a mix of young and adult animals.  
 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Benin 7216 6930 7982 10914 10361 8542 5924 8415 10670 11893
Cameroun 52000 64131 63400 62000 61800 60000 57109 58531 55135 52801
Congo DR 3780 3876 3973 3844 3954 3954 4300 4600 5000 5000
Congo R 17912 18965 19600 19095 17500 18241 20520 22729 25510 26346
Ivory 
coast 58374 58854 57606 52137 57071 63709 65270 62926 55900 45903
Eq 
Guinea 4369 1856 4140 5240 5035 5900 2558 2500 2500 2500
Gabon 26515 32789 36680 34143 44609 41143 37053 33021 31475 35269
Ghana 280737 292844 403153 377088 368141 418276 370441 366849 296678 315756
Guinea 60000 64760 60580 58841 65764 83314 87513 101227 87358 114845
Guinea B 5750 6078 6750 7000 5800 4800 4800 4800 4800 4800
Liberia 3721 4829 3408 4580 6830 11472 7726 7286 7500 7300
Nigeria 163259 231579 248472 294279 324004 316235 309062 297971 293823 300194
Sao Tome 3391 3565 3980 3338 3477 3756 3500 3400 3300 3283
Sierra L 47439 49870 52804 58128 48875 44927 60730 61210 68990 82926
Togo 8052 7203 10098 9290 11655 17924 17277 18163 15946 22485
Mauritania 46746 48147 55324 52756 56660 71026 75849 79881 73902 75000
Senegal 322421 323617 388759 426366 382872 378125 379579 383202 355824 428174
TOTAL 1111682 1219893 1426709 1479039 1474408 1551344 1509211 1516711 1394311 1534475
Table 3 Marine fish catches (tonnes) in the gulf of Guinea countries 1994-2003 
47
 





This clearly shows that a coastal narrow zone in the Gulf of Guinea supports the fish 
stock and receives the majority of the fishing effort. 
 
Djama T. (1992) while discussing the interaction between artisanal and industrial 
fishermen echoes the same characteristics of the fisheries in the area. He observes 
that the conflict between artisanal and industrial fishing in the coastal area of the 
Gulf of Guinea stems from the fact that they compete in the same fishing grounds. 
These grounds are located near the shore in shallow waters. This characteristic 
implies that any unsustainable fishing method and gears will automatically destroy 
young and adult animals; leading to the depletion of the fishing resources as it may 
jeopardize their renewal capacity.     
 
The fishing resources in the Gulf of Guinea are already recognized as being under 
extreme pressure. The presence of the offshore commercial fishing fleet as well as 
the important artisanal sub sector has placed fisheries at risk of collapse (Ukwe et 
al., 2003). 
 
Although the catch statistics show a steady increase in production during the last 
decade in the Gulf of Guinea countries (Figure 2) in reality there is an important shift 
in their composition.  Indeed, the analysis of landings revels that the species 
diversity and the average body total length of most important fish assemblages have 
declined in the zone while the catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is exceeding 
sustainable yield in some countries (Ajayi, 1998; Ukwe et al., 2006). In Cameroon 
for instance, the quantity of big sizes of commercial high valued fish such as 
Scianides ssp, flat fish and shrimps has decreased over time to constitute a 
relatively small part of the landings, less than 5% (MINEPIA; 2003). 
 
The causes of the decrease of the catch value are related to the unsustainable 
fishing practices, which include the use of fishing gear with small mesh sizes; the 
use of poison such as pesticides and the use of explosives to catch fish; as well as 
inadequate fisheries management approaches (GIWA, 2003).   
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4.2 Management measures 
 
The management of the fisheries resource in the Gulf of Guinea countries is done 
by fisheries authorities of individual countries in the waters under their jurisdiction. 
There is however a difference in approaches according to the zones of the Sea 
under consideration: the coastal zone or the EEZ.  
4.2.1 Management in the coastal zone 
 
Garcia (2002) while studying the evolution of fishing management approaches over 
years maintained that fisheries management in the Gulf of Guinea coastal waters is 
done by each country in their areas of jurisdiction and is extensively based on the 
“input limitation scheme”, where fishing effort is controlled through licenses. 
  
4.2.1.1 Access  
 
The maritime fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea are not open access resources; the 
individual countries regulate the access to ensure their sustainability. The access to 
coastal fisheries grounds in all the countries of the zone is subject to the 
authorization granted by the fisheries authorities. These authorizations include 
fishing permits and fishing licenses (Table 4). 
 
The condition of access differs according to the class of fisheries, the countries, and 
the fishing zone to be exploited. Fishing activities in the Gulf of Guinea are divided 
into two main categories including artisanal fishing and industrial fishing (Table 4). 
Some countries however distinguish an intermediary third category, which is the 
semi industrial fishing. This is the case for the Republic of Cameroon, Gabon and 
the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. 
 
The distinction between these categories differs from one country to another and is 




Table 4:  Conditions of access to GOG fisheries 
 
Country Artisanal fisheries Semi-industrial 
fisheries 
Industrial fisheries E EZ 
Benin Fishing permit 
(5 nautical mile) 
          _ Fishing license 
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Guinea Bissau Fishing permit 
( up to 60 HP) 
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Fishing agreements 










     _ 
Licence 
. Demersal species 
. Shrimp 
. Tuna ,sardine 
 
 




















- Licenses  
 demersal trawler 
 Shrimp trawlers 
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Source: Compiled by the author (based on FAO data) 
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The industrial fisheries involve the use of large fishing boats powered with inboard 
engines using mechanic active fishing gears such as the bottom trawls and purse 
seine.  Those boats generally have onboard conservation equipments including 
deep freezers and cold store rooms to support a long period at sea. 
 
The artisanal fisheries on the other hand use small canoes powered or not by an 
outboard engine and using passive fishing gears such as gillnets and traps. The 
power of the outboard engine in that case might be different from one country to 
another. For instance, small boats powered with outboard engines of less than 60 
horse power (HP) are classified in the artisanal fisheries sub sector in Guinea 
Bissau; whereas the maximum engine power required to be classified in the 
artisanal fisheries in Cameroon is 40 HP (Table 4). 
 
 In between these two categories, some countries including Mauritania, Cameroon 
and Gabon have created an intermediary semi industrial fisheries class. For 
instance, in Cameroon small boats powered by an outboard engine of 40 HP or 
more are classified into this category. Similarly, a small fishing boat powered with 
outboard engine of less than 40 HP but using active fishing techniques is also 
classify into this category. For example, the “Awasha” fishing boat, which is a 
traditional wooden or plank made fishing canoe of 18 to 22m long, 2 to 3m wide, 
operated by 20 to 23 men and propelled by a 40 HP outboard engine. The gear use 
is the purse seine and the main species targeted are Ethmalosa fimbriata, Sardinella 
madarensis and other small pelagic species (Njifounjou, 1996). 
 
In Cameroon and Gabon the “awasha” are generally operated by fishermen from 
Nigeria or those from Ghana as the local fishermen do not handle this technique 
very well. 
 
The access to fisheries in the coastal zone of the Gulf of Guinea countries are in the 
majority of cases subject to the authorization of the government authorities in the 
form of a fishing permit in the case of artisanal and semi industrial fisheries and a 
fishing license in the case of industrial fisheries. 
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The access by artisanal fishers to fisheries of almost all the countries of the zone is 
subject to the fishing permit, which is delivered by the fisheries authorities. However, 
two countries in the GOG have free access to national artisanal fishermen, Nigeria 
and the Guinea Republic (Table 4). The situation is changing in Guinea, for instance, 
where foreign artisanal fishermen from Senegal and Ghana, who exploit high valued 
fish, are required as from 2005 to get fishing licenses (FAO, 2006). 
 
The industrial fishing case is different. The access of the industrial fishing vessels to 
the fishing grounds is subject to the delivery of a fishing license in all the countries of 
the Gulf of Guinea. The fishing licenses are, however, different depending on the 
target species, the fishing gear used and the country (Table 4). 
 
4.2.1.2 Access restriction 
 
The access to waters and resources are restricted in some areas of the Gulf of 
Guinea. These restrictive aims are on the one hand to ensure the sustainability 
management of fisheries resources by protecting the spawning and the growing 
zone and on the other hand to protect the interests of the artisanal fishermen who 
generally have less means to compete with industrial fishermen. 
 
Many countries of the zone have therefore prohibited the trawling activities of the 
industrial fishermen to a certain zone from the shoreline, which correspond to the 
exclusive zone allocated to the artisanal fishermen. The dimension of this area is 
different from one country to another. For instance, in the Guinea Republic the zone 
is 12 nautical miles wide, while it is 5 nautical miles in Benin and Nigeria and 7 miles 
for Senegal (FAO, 2004). Furthermore, the Cameroonian fisheries Law clearly 
states that trawling activities are prohibited within the three nautical miles from the 
shore exclusively reserved for the artisanal fishermen. 
 
However, the countries generally encounter some difficulties in the enforcement of 
the access restriction measures. The characteristics of the Gulf of Guinea coastal 
waters show that the highly productive areas are located, in shallow water near the 
shore, which in most countries is the zone reserved for artisanal fishermen (Djama, 
 52
1992). The industrial vessels in the search of more productive area usually make 
incursions into this zone exclusively reserved for artisanal fisheries in profound 
violation of the Law resulting in the destruction of artisanal fishermen gear resulting 
in conflicts. 
 
4.2.1.3  Technical conservation measures 
 
The Gulf of Guinea countries, to ensure the conservation of the fisheries resources 
have adopted a variety of technical measures, which include: 
 
• Regulation on mesh sizes and fishing nets; 
• Regulation on fish sizes to be landed  
• Regulation on fishing gear and appliances; 
• Establishment of open, closed areas and seasons; 
• Restriction of access to certain areas for licensed vessels according to their 
capacity and sizes; 
• Prohibition of certain types of fishing methods and gear. 
 
There is not however a common agreement on the effects of various gears or fishing 
methods on the marine fisheries among countries of the GOG region.  For instance, 
the twin trawling system is recognized as being a bad-fishing method for the 
conservation of the resource and therefore is banned in all the countries waters; 
whereas the purse seine banned in the Republique of Guinea are allowed in other 
countries.  
 
This difference may be due to the specificity of the coastal zone in the various 
countries. The Gulf of Guinea coastal areas is very shallow and in the countries 
such as the Guinea Republic the average depth for almost 70% of the continental 
shelf is 40m (FAO, 2000). In that case, some fishing gear and methods will be very 
destructive for the marine resources and environment. 
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Similarly, the mesh sizes for the same gear might be different among countries. For 
instance, the maximum mesh size allowed for the bottom gillnet in Guinea is limited 
to 35mm, while it is of 40 mm in Cameroon. 
 
The closed seasons and areas are well established in fisheries regulations of the 
GOG countries, so as to ensure the reproduction of the target species. However, 
some countries such as Guinea have chosen not to have closed seasons in relation 
to the specificity of the oceanography of their coastal zone, which witness recurrent 
upwelling phenomenon; consequently, can support fishing activities all year round 
(FAO, 2005). Conversely, many countries including Senegal, Mauritania or Cote 
d´Ivoire, Gabon have established and are respecting the closed seasons, periods 
within which all the fishing activities in the zone under consideration are banned. 
These periods vary from one country to another and may extend from 2 to 4 months. 
In Gabon for instance, the closed season for the shrimps is from the 1st January to 
30th April and that of the sardines (Ethmalosa fimbriata) from the 1st September to 
the 31st October (Ngwe, A., 2006). 
 
Another group of countries have put in place regulations on closed seasons, which 
are not yet implemented. This is the case in Cameroon where the Law establishes 
the closed seasons in principle; however, its application is yet to be undertaken as 
there is no clear determination of the zones as well as the periods. This lack in 
regulation may be due to the absence of the preliminary work of the research to 
determine the reproduction period of the target species and the specific zones of 
reproduction.  
 
Another tool used by fisheries managers of the Gulf of Guinea countries to control 
the activities of the industrial fishing fleet is the use of Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance System (MCS). They include the installment of telemetric systems on 
board licensed vessels, to monitor their movements and therefore ensure that they 
respect the fishing zones and to embark fishing observers on board vessels.  
 
According to Caddy F. et al. (2001) the requirement to embark scientific observers 
as well as the requirement to install compulsory telemetric systems involving direct 
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monitoring via satellite of fishing operations via telemetric systems installed into 
fishing vessels has progressively become a condition for licensing. This move has 
already been made by the Gulf of Guinea countries where control of fishing activities 
via satellite and the use of in board fisheries controllers have been adopted and 
included in the countries fisheries regulations. In Cameroon for instance, a 
Ministerial decision signed in December 2005 made compulsory the installation of 
telemetric tools, which is the Argos systems as a requirement to be granted a fishing 
license. 
 
The control of fishing activities is less difficult in coastal waters near the shore with 
the application of technical measures; however, the situation in the EEZs of the 
GOG countries is rather complicated.  
 
4.2.2 Management in the EEZ: fisheries agreements 
 
 
Some of the countries of the GULF of Guinea have declared Exclusive Economic 
Zones (See Table 1), rich in fisheries resources. Due to the lack of capacity from the 
coastal state, foreign fleets from Europe and Asia generally undertake the 
exploitation of these resources under fisheries agreements.  
 
The coastal States generally sign individually agreements with their foreign partners 
in the form of fishing rights and they receive financial compensations in return. The 
financial compensations are sometimes very important for the economies of these 
countries. In fact, the collection of the licenses fees from the European Community 
for instance, in the form of a single lump may give to the country a good amount of 
foreign currency that can be used in the State emergency expenditures such as the 
payment of salaries of the country officials. It was shown by Kaczynski (2002) that 
the total amount of compensation paid by the European Community to the Gulf of 
Guinea states within the last 25 year period until 2006 is USD 674 million. 
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The agreements signed between GOG countries and their European or Asian 
partners are generally based on catch capacity in the form of gross tonnage and do 
not contain catch quotas.  
4.3 Effectiveness of the management measures  
 
4.3.1 Effectiveness of the management measures in the coastal areas 
 
4.3.1.1 Access restriction 
 
 The characteristics of fisheries in the GOG coastal areas shows that the coastal 
assemblages of some target species mainly Croackers are located in the estuarine 
and inshore areas (Koranteng, 2002). Moreover, the zone is rich in many 
commercial species of mix adult and young fish living together in the same areas in 
depth (Folack, 1995; Moses, 1992). Consequently, the areas restriction measure 
prohibiting the trawling activities in areas near the shore may successfully contribute 
to the conservation of the resources. 
 
However, this area limitation is not fully enforced in almost all of the countries of the 
zone. Incursions of fishing trawlers inside the prohibited zone, exclusively reserved 
to the artisanal fishermen are reported in most countries, resulting in loss of fishing 
gears, loss of canoes and even loss of lives (Zantou, P., 2006; Diallo, M. et al., 2003; 
Njama, 1992). 
 
4.3.1.2 Technical conservative measures 
 
This lack of enforcement and compliance with this management measures have 
along with other factors contributed to the decline of coastal fisheries in the zone  
 
The countries of the GOG, to ensure the conservation of the resources in the 
coastal areas have adopted a bulk of technical measures, including the prohibition 
of destructive fishing methods and practices such as the use of pesticide and blast 
fishing; the limitation of the mesh and the fish to be landed sizes and the closed 
areas and season. These technical measures are not, however, comply with by the 
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fishermen. In fact, the small scale fishermen have rather adopted destructive fishing 
practices including the undersize meshes, poisoning and blast fishing (Ukwe et al., 
2006). 
 
The consequence of non enforcement of the management measures has led to the 
overexploitation of the resource, resulting in a progressive decline of commercially 
valuable fish. Ukwe et al. (2006) indicate that in some countries of the GOG, the 
artisanal as well as the industrial commercial fisheries are about to or have already 
exceeded the point of sustainability. 
 
Therefore, the management measures in the coastal areas are not effective not 
because they do not in principle address the issue of resource conservation; but 
rather, because they are not enforced and comply with by both the artisanal and 
industrial fishers. 
 
4.3.2 Effectiveness of fisheries agreements 
 
The agreements signed between the GOG countries and their European or Asian 
partners for the exploitation of the fishing resources in their EEZs are based on 
catch capacity and do not contain catch quotas (Kaczynski, 2002).  
 
The access rights are established based on the vessel size measured into gross 
registered tonnage (GRT), which can lead to over harvesting when it is well known 
that the capacity of a vessel to fish is not related to its GRT, but rather to the 
technology and the gears used. Therefore, the fisheries agreements promote 
excessive pressure on the resources that heavily harm the marine resources in the 
region (Ukwe et al., 2006). The fact that countries do not have the capacity to 
monitor the activities in their EEZs is worsening situation.  
 
Further, in most of the agreements, the EU negotiates the right to increase the 
harvesting capacity without any consent of the coastal State. This situation, 
associate to the fact that there is no scientific research undertaken prior to the 
access negotiations to ensure that the fishing effort fixed in the agreement may be 
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adequate for the conservation of the resource, have result into a degradation of fish 
stock in the GOG countries EEZs (Kaczynski, 2002). Significant changes towards 
smaller fish size classes have been observed in the offshore demersal and pelagic 
species usually exploited by foreign fishing fleet under agreements, related interalia 
to the pressure on the offshore resources by the foreign trawlers (Fonteneau et al., 
1999).  
 
The result of these “favorable” fisheries agreements, driven by the poverty of the 
GOG countries, has led to over harvesting, which have hampered the stock and 
diminish the attractiveness of the EEZs. For example, Senegal has had favorable 
fisheries cooperation with the European Union for more than 15 years including 
attractive access and less restrictions. The result is a negative impact on both the 
environment and the society with a depleted stock, a disrupted artisanal fisheries 
and a substantial decrease in access fees (Kaczynski, 2002). 
 
Consequently, the fisheries agreements signed between the Gulf of Guinea 
countries and their European, or Asian partners do not in reality favor the 





PERCEPTIONS OF RESOURCE USERS TOWARDS 
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT MEASURES AND ENFORCEMENT 
  
5.1 Fishermen perception towards fisheries management in the GOG 
 
There are many ways to manage fisheries, but the approach adopted by the Gulf of 
Guinea countries is a combination of measures that regulate the input into the 
fishery including licenses and fishing permits, limits on areas and time, limits on 
gears and limits on mesh and fish sizes. These measures, put in place by the policy 
maker may be perceived differently by the stakeholders and this perception may 
influence the level of enforcement.  
 
5.1.1 Perceptions towards areas 
 
 
The Gulf of Guinea countries, to ensure the sustainable exploitation of their living 
marine resources have enacted areas restriction regulations, which prohibit 
industrial commercial vessel’s activities in a certain zone close to the shore (Table 
4).  
 
In Cameroon for instance, the Law No 94/ 01 of the 20 January 1994, and its Decree 
of application No 95/413/ PM of the 20th June 1995, which regulate fisheries 
activities, have prohibited trawling activities within the three nautical miles from the 
shore, to protect the fisheries resources; dedicating, therefore, this zone to the 
artisanal fishermen. This area restriction regulation is not fully enforced by industrial 
trawlers, who usually make incursions into these zones, especially at night, resulting 
into the destruction of fishermen gears and conflicts. In fact, the fishermen of the 
four fishing villages, interviewed complained about the industrial trawlers destroying 
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their fishing nets and cutting down their lines inside the three nautical-miles; 
confirming therefore that the industrial fishers usually breach that Law.  
The face to face discussions with the representative of fishermen associations in the 
four Cameroonian fishing villages where the study was conducted shows that all the 
fishermen (artisanal and industrial), do agree with this management decision. 
 
However, there is a difference in perception of the rationale of the decision between 
artisanal and commercial industrial fishermen. 
 
For most of the artisanal fishers, the decision of the Government to prohibit the 
trawling activities inside the three nautical zones is to protect the juveniles’ fish and 
the fish spawning zone.  This was clearly points out by the Nigerians fishermen 
representative in “Limbe” fishing village who maintained that: 
 
         The Government decision to prohibit the activities of the big fish trawlers near  
          the coast is  good, it protect small fish being destroyed by those trawlers.  
          The fish will then grow and we and our sons and their sons will continue  
           the activity and still catch fish”.  
 
                             Effiong, E., Nigerian fisherman, (Limbe, 10/07/2006) 
 
This intervention also displays the social dimension of such a decision, which is to 
protect the artisanal fishermen interests and livelihood against the industrial trawlers. 
For some of them this was the rationale behind the decision and, therefore, argues 
that the Ministry in charge of fisheries should not only increase the breadth of this 
zone but also ensure that the industrial fishermen do not make incursions into it.  
 
Similarly, two of the fishing trawlers captains interviewed believe that the prohibition 
of the trawling activities into the three nautical miles zone is more a decision to 
protect and help the artisanal fishermen rather than a measure to protect young fish. 
 
This perception of the role of the three nautical mile zone prohibition, which for the 
industrial fishers is more a social (protection of artisanal fishers interests) rather than 
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a biological (protection of spawning and growing areas) decision, may therefore 
justify their culture of non compliance with this rule, which often result in artisanal 
fishermen gears destruction and conflicts. 
 
Moreover, the characteristics of fisheries the in the GOG coastal zone may give 
incentives to this perception and the subsequent behavior of rule breaching. Indeed, 
Koranteng (2002) indicates that the fish assemblages (croakers) on the continental 
shelves of the GOG countries are located in the coastal areas, principally in nutrient-
rich estuarine and inshore areas; consequently in the restricted area of most of the 
countries. This characteristic may act as an “incentive” that reinforces the behaviour 
of the fish trawlers, in search of productive fishing grounds.  
 
This situation of non enforcement of the area limitation rule is not limited to the 
Cameroonian coast and extends to other countries of the GOG. A report from the 
Sustainable Fisheries Livelihood Programme shows that the recurrent incursions of 
industrial trawlers into the 10 nautical miles zone reserved to the artisanal fishermen 
in Guinea Republic have led to the loss of artisanal fishermen lives, in addition to the 
destruction of their fishing gears and canoes (Diallo, M. et al., 2003).  
 
Similarly the 7-mile zone allocated to artisanal fishermen in Senegal is not all the 
time comply with by the industrial fishing trawlers resulting in conflicts that are not in 
general easy to settle (Zantou, P., 2006).  
 
However, the industrial fishers’ perception of the area limitation and their 
subsequent behaviour may not be the only reason that encourages them to breach 
that rule, but also the absence of an effective enforcement body. The discussion 
with the Master of one industrial fishing trawler revealed that they voluntarily enter 
the prohibited zone as they know that fisheries surveillance system does not exist.  
 
Indeed, effective fishing surveillance is still at its infancy in the Gulf of Guinea 
countries. Although activities are being carried out in some countries such as 
Senegal, Mauritania or the Guinea Republic with few good results, effective 
enforcement bodies are absent in almost all the countries of the Gulf of Guinea.  
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Furthermore, the move towards the satellite approach of surveillance is being made 
in a slowly pace in many countries of the zone. In Cameroon for instance, the 
authorities are still looking at the best way to make the industry accept to install 
telemetric tools onboard industrial vessels, so as to start to monitor them; while 
Gabon is still encountering logistics and technical problems (Ngwe, A., 2006). 
 
The poor behaviour of “rules breaching” of the GOG industrial trawlers is partly 
justified by their perception of the area limitation rule and the absence of an effective 
enforcement body. This conclusion joins Mc Clanahan (2005) analysis concerning 
the perception of Kenyan reefs fishermen towards rules. He asserts that a fisherman 
will continue to use a method he thinks give him more yield unless he is stopped by 
the enforcement body. 
 
5.1.2 Perception towards gears 
 
In the GOG, certain fishing gears and methods are prohibited. However, these 
management measures are not fully enforced and the fishermen do not in reality 
comply with them. 
 
The perception of fishermen towards gear restriction was also looked at during the 
discussions with the artisanal fishermen of the Batoke fishing village (Cameroon). A 
previous study conducted by the MINEPIA in 2002, within the framework of the 
Sustainable Fisheries Livelihood Programme (SFLP), has shown that more than 
90% of the fishing gears used in that fishing village was beach seine, prohibited by a 
Ministerial Arrete as part of the conservation measures to ensure the sustainability 
of the resource (MINEPIA, 2003).  
 
The discussions with the fishermen revealed that they are aware that the fishing 
method is discouraged by the Government. Nevertheless, they explain that they 
have been using this method for years resulting in good yields and argue that the 
Government should focus in fighting against the use of poison or the incursion of 
fishing trawlers into the three nautical miles zone. The end result is that this fishing 
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community continues to use the beach seine technique and do not therefore enforce 
the Law. 
 
This intervention clearly shows that the fishermen continue to use that fishing 
method because they perceive, it continues to sustain catches. The underlying 
rationale behind this behaviour is the economic return of that particular fishing gear, 
although the policymakers think it is very destructive. Therefore, any management 
that will try to discourage the use of this type of fishing gear will not be successful 
unless it is accompanied with sanctions and penalties.  
 
This conclusion is also supported by Mc Clanahan et al. (2005), who studied the 
perception of resource users and managers towards management options in Kenya 
coral reefs and maintained that the acceptance of these restrictions by stakeholders 
can vary for a variety of reasons including legal, economic , cultural, technological 
reasons and may lead to confusion, conflicts, poor enforcement and unsustainable 
use unless efforts are made to understand and rationalize the multiple type of 
possible management.  They concluded that the persistence of prohibited seine 
fishing techniques is the result of a competitive advantage and unlikely to be 
eliminated without enforcement by the Government and pressures from others (Mc 
Clanahan et al., 2005). 
 
This economic based perception of resource users may also justify the sustainability 
of destructive fishing methods, such as, poisoning or the use of blasts. Ukwe at al 
(2006) maintained that the decline of the fish availability in the subsistence sector of 
the GOG countries has led to the adoption of destructive practices.  
 
Another case that illustrates how the discrepancy in perception can lead to poor 
compliance in the Cameroonian context is the actual misunderstanding between 
policy maker and industrial fishermen as concerns the installation of telemetric tools 
on board fishing vessels as part of the Monitoring Control and Surveillance System. 
 
 A ministerial decision, signed in 2005 made compulsory the installation of telemetric 
tools on board each fishing trawler as part of the requirements for the fishing license. 
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However, this decision, to be implemented as from the 1st January 2006, has not yet 
been enforced. All the fishing vessels have not complied with the decision and in 
return, none of them have received a fishing license for 2006. 
 
The fisheries administration, on the one hand, justifies the decision by arguing 
rightly that the activities of the fishing vessels will be well monitored on the field, 
which will therefore enhance the implementation of the regulation pertaining to the 
respect of fishing zones and participe in the overall effort towards the conservation 
of the resources. The industrial fishing owners on the other hand, did accept the 
benefices of the approach for the conservation of the resources. They, however, 
consider that the Government being in charge of the management of the resource 
and the surveillance activities should bear the cost of the installation of the 
telemetric tools. The result of this discrepancy of perception is that the management 
decision is poorly enforced. 
 
This situation illustrates as well the difficulty of enforcement within a situation of a 
top down approach where there is a government authority that take decisions and 
the fishing industry oblige to implement the decisions without a prior consultation. 
The stakeholder consultation and involvement in the decision making is recognized 
as being a good incentive for them to comply with the rules (Grossling, 2006). 
 
5.2 Fishermen perception towards fisheries management in the EU 
 
The fisheries management in the European Union is undertaken at the level of the 
European Community through the Common Fisheries Policy; which is basically an 
output limitation scheme, where fishing effort is controlled through total allowable 
catch and quotas.  
 
The perception of the European stakeholders towards the common fisheries 
management policy was clearly summarized in the speech made by Mr Dermot 
Ahern, President- in- Office of the Council, before the Fisheries Committee of the 
European Parliament on Tuesday 20 January 2004 during the adoption of the 
regulation on the Regional Advisory Councils. He maintained that: 
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- Fishermen are often sceptical about scientific advice and do not always feel 
"ownership" of the decisions that determine their livelihoods;  
-  Scientists too often wonder whether managers hide behind scientific advice 
to avoid taking difficult political decisions; 
- There is a perception in some quarters, not always justified, that decision 
makers are too removed from those affected by their decisions.  
 
                   Mr Dermot Ahern Speech, Tuesday 20 January 2004   
 
The fishermen of the European Union do not always feel the ownership of 
management decisions. They do not therefore, have any incentive to enforce them 
and adopt long term management strategies that result in the conservation of the 
resource (EC, 2002). 
 
This can be seen in the discrepancy between the official regulation (quotas) and 
actual fish mortality. For example, Karagiannakos (1995) compares the trends of 
landings and the agreed TACs from 1980 to 1994. He concluded that the landings 
do not follow the agreed TAC but rather the status of the fish stock. Equally, data 
from the Swedish Cod fishery, from 1974 to 2004, shows that the landings follow the 
fish biomass. The fact that the landings do not follow the agreed TAC shows that EU 
fishermen are violating the output control set by the EU. 
 
Rossitier et al. (2003) reported from a study conducted in Scotland that, many 
fishermen find it difficult to accept a management system that instructs them to 
return marketable fish dead at sea.  
This perception has certainly led to the development the illegal landing of “black fish”.  
Richie as cited in Daw et al. (2005) points out after a study conducted on UK 
landings that, there were a culture of “breaking rules” amongst fishermen and a high 
reliance on illegal landings. The fishermen were violating the EU quota requirement 
because of economic reasons and because the system was flawed and inefficient.     
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Similarly, the phenomenon of “high grading”, in which fishermen retain larger and 
more valuable fish and throw the others at sea, is wide spread in the EU waters in 
total breath of the EU rules (Shepherd, 2003).   
 
The perception of the fishermen towards management measures in the EU influence 
greatly their willingness to enforce those rules.  








There are many ways to manage fisheries. The European Union countries on the 
one hand, have opted for a common policy on fisheries management, which is 
extensively based on the control of the “output” from fisheries through the total 
allowable catch and the quota management system. The Gulf of Guinea countries, 
on the other, have preferred to manage the fisheries resources at the national level, 
based on measures that control “input” into fisheries through licenses and permits. 
 
The analysis of the Common Fisheries Policy effectiveness concerning the 
conservation of the resource reveals many problems that might jeopardized the 
sustainability of the resource. The setting of the total allowable catch is surrounded 
by political pressure and does not therefore always reflect the scientific advice 
provided by the ICES; the fishing fleet policy, which aimed at reducing the fishing 
capacity, is overbalanced by  grants for new building and the modernization of the 
existing fleet sustaining, therefore, the overcapacity and the subsequent 
overexploitation; the quota system has encouraged, the “high grading” phenomena 
where, big and valuable fish are retain on board and the others are thrown 
overboard, increasing the discards at sea.  
 
The perception of the fishermen towards the management measures shows that 
they do not always feel the “ownership” of the measures that determine their 
livelihoods and therefore do not feel bound by them. These perceptions have led 
fishermen to adopt behaviour of rules breaching including landings of illegal fish and 
misreporting.   
 
 67
Conversely, the analysis of the effectiveness of management measures undertaken 
by the Gulf of Guinea countries shows that they might result “in principle” in the 
conservation of the resource. In relation to the characteristics of the resources in the 
coastal zone, there are measures limiting the access of trawlers; measures 
prohibiting certain type of fishing methods and fishing gears; measures limitating the 
mesh and the fish sizes. However, these management measures are not fully 
enforced, resulting in the degradation of fish stocks in the zone. 
 
In addition, the management of the offshore resources, done through fishing 
agreements signed with the EU or Asian countries, generally encourages the 
overcapacity and the subsequent overexploitation of the resource.  
 
Moreover, the study conducted in some fishing villages in Cameroon reveals that 
the fishermen perception towards management measures varies according to the 
measure in question and to the class of fishermen (industrial or artisanal). The 
industrial fishermen perceive the area limit rule as a social decision in favor of 
artisanal fishermen and are, therefore, not willing to enforce it. Further, the artisanal 
fishermen consider some gear prohibition as a threat to their high yield harvesting 
tool, sustaining therefore the activity. 
 
The analysis of the perception of the fishermen towards management measures in 
the European Union and in the Gulf of Guinea show that fishermen are willing to 
breach any measure perceived as reducing their income or the economic return of 
their activity. Consequently, their willingness to comply with the management 
measures are more influenced by the economy rather than any other factor 
including the conservation of the resource or their participation in the decision 
making.  
 
Therefore, in both areas, any management measure adopted to ensure the 
conservation of the resource, regardless the way that it was enacted: by the law 
making body alone or with the participation of the resource users should be 




Based on the above conclusions, certain recommendations can be made for a better 
management, which ensures the conservation of the resource. 
6.2.1 For the European Union countries 
 
The management of the resource under the CFP should move from the indirect 
control of the fishing effort through total allowable catch and quota management to a 
more direct control of the effort through the number of days at sea. 
 
This system has some advantages. The fishermen would be able to land and sell all 
the marketable sizes of fish caught. Therefore, the phenomenon of discards of over 
quota fish at sea and “high grading” will disappear (Shepherd, 2003).   
 
Furthermore, the misreporting of catches and the illegal landings of fish will be 
reduced, enabling the scientists to have accurate data on the fisheries and therefore, 
enhancing their capability to give relevant advice. 
  
Moreover, the approach will help to solve the problem of mixed fisheries, by allowing 
the landings of all the species cached, reducing therefore the discards at sea. 
Fishermen may, therefore reduce the fishing effort by deducing the number of 
fishing days and still have economic return of the activity (Rossitier et al., 2003).  
 
However, such a system to give expected results should put in place effective 
enforcement tools, which monitor the compliance with the number of days at sea by 
each fishing vessel. For example, the European Community could put in place a 
regional enforcement body that use satellite instruments to monitor activities of the 
fishing vessels. Accurate information on the movement of each vessel will then be 
available including effective days at sea and days of rests.  
In addition to this input approach of management, decommissioning should really 
play its role of reducing the fishing capacity. Therefore, the EU should make the 
funds available for the decommissioning scheme equal to those available for the 
building of new vessel or for the modernization of the existing fleet. This will reduce 
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or avoid increasing the capacity and therefore, enhances the conservation of the 
resource.  
6.2.2 For the Gulf of Guinea countries 
 
The Gulf of Guinea countries should keep the actual management approach based 
on input into the fisheries. However, in each country of the zone, the enforcement 
need to be strengthened and some technical conservative measures should be 
changed. 
The countries of the Gulf of Guinea should put in place effective Monitoring Control 
and Surveillance Systems preferably based on satellite aids, to ensure that the 
management measures are fully comply with by the industrial fishermen. 
 
There is a need to increase the zone prohibited for the trawling activities, so as 
ensure a proper protection of the spawning and growing areas, ensuring therefore 
the renewal of the resource. 
 
The collaboration between the fisheries authorities and the fishing communities 
should be enhanced in the form of co-management or a collaborative enforcement 
body, to ensure that resource users views are taken in account during the setting of 
the management measures and that they comply with those measures. This 
approach can be done through “fishing villages management committees”, which 
include a “local enforcement body” to avoid the use of destructive fishing method 
and gears by fishermen themselves. 
 
The countries of the GOG should attempt to harmonize their fishing legislation 
concerning the access to the resource and the management measures, which can 
be done through a regional organization. In fact an attempt is being made by the 
Regional Fisheries Committee for the Gulf of Guinea, with less success and do not 
even include all the countries of the zone.  
The countries should equally adopt a regional enforcement body for the surveillance 
of the fishing activities in their EEZ and their boundary areas. This joint body could 
take the responsibility to negotiate with the European Union and the Asian countries 
for the fisheries agreements, to secure advantageous agreements that help the 
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Guide for the discussions conducted with fishermen 
 
• Knowledge about fishing management measures 
• Limits on areas 
• Point of view about limits on areas 
• Gears prohibition 
• Point of view on gear prohibition 
• Economic consequences 
• Social consequences 
• Adhesion to measures 
• Propositions 
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